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Do Rising Top Incomes Lift All Boats? 
Abstract 
 
 
Pooling data for 1905 to 2000, we find no systematic relationship between top income 
shares and economic growth in a panel of 12 developed nations observed for between 22 
and 85 years. After 1960, however, a one percentage point rise in the top decile’s income 
share is associated with a statistically significant 0.12 point rise in GDP growth during 
the following year. This relationship is not driven by changes in either educational 
attainment or top tax rates. If the increase in inequality is permanent, the increase in 
growth appears to be permanent, but it takes 13 years for the cumulative positive effect of 
faster growth on the mean income of the bottom nine deciles to offset the negative effect 
of reducing their share of total income.   
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I. Introduction 
Research on the relationship between economic inequality and growth expanded rapidly 
during the 1990s. Initially, several studies suggested that inequality was bad for 
subsequent growth, but these studies were based on comparisons between countries with 
different initial levels of inequality, not comparisons between changes in inequality and 
changes in subsequent growth within the same country. As a result, skeptics found it easy 
to argue that the results might be due to omitted variable bias. The release of Deininger 
and Squire’s  (1996) data set allowed investigators to estimate changes in income 
inequality within a large number of countries.
1 This possibility led to a series of papers 
estimating the effect of changes in inequality on changes in GDP. These papers (notably 
Forbes 2000) generally found that increases in inequality were good for growth. 
Yet even when Deininger and Squire’s measures of inequality came from the 
same country, they were not always comparable to one another.  Inequality measures in 
the Deininger-Squire dataset differ according to whether they are based on income or 
expenditure, whether they include or exclude taxes, and whether they are based on 
families or households. Consequently, an influential review by Atkinson and Brandolini 
(2001) concluded that: 
“there is no real alternative to seeking data-sets where the observations are 
as fully consistent as possible; at the same time, the choice of definition on 
which to standardize may affect the conclusions drawn ... we are not 
convinced that at present it is possible to use secondary datasets safely 
without some knowledge of the underlying sources, and we caution 
strongly against mechanical use of such data-sets.”   3
That observation suggests that new data on trends in inequality would be valuable for 
assessing the impact of inequality on growth.
2   This paper uses new data derived from 
tax reports. 
The use of tax data to estimate income inequality has a long history (eg. Bowley 
1914; Kuznets 1953). Here, we draw on a series of recent papers that have combined tax 
data with external population and income control totals to estimate the changing share of 
income going to families and individuals above the 90th percentile of the distribution. We 
use two such measures: the shares of personal income going to the richest 10 per cent and 
the richest 1 per cent of the population. These measures are attractive because increases 
in income inequality since 1980 have been driven primarily by increases in top income 
shares, making their effect of particular policy interest, and tax data are also the most 
reliable source of information about top income shares.  In addition, tax data are more 
likely than the diverse surveys that Deininger and Squire collated to employ a consistent 
methodology from one year to the next. Consequently, these tax data potentially provide 
a more reliable gauge of changes in inequality than the estimates sourced from the 
Deininger-Squire database (see Section II). Finally, tax data are usually available on an 
annual basis, and a number of countries now have such data going back to the first 
quarter of the twentieth century.   
Despite all these advantages, our tax data also have important limitations.  In 
particular, they do not provide information on inequality within the bottom 90 per cent of 
the distribution.  Furthermore, there is some evidence that changes in top income shares 
do not have the same effect on growth as changes further down in the distribution 
(Voitchovsky, 2005).   4
One central aim of this paper is to re-examine the relationship between inequality 
– as proxied by the top incomes data – and growth.
3 Like Forbes (2000), we utilize panel 
estimation techniques, and like Forbes we find evidence that since 1960 a rise in 
inequality has been associated with a modest short-term rise in the growth rate. Our 
second aim is to take advantage of annual data on inequality to calibrate the magnitude 
and persistence of these positive effects more precisely.  Finally, we use these results to 
estimate how long it is likely to take for the positive effects of higher inequality on 
growth to offset the negative effects of higher inequality on the share of personal income 
going to those in the bottom 90 per cent of the distribution. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly discusses the existing 
literature. Section III describes our data, while Section IV outlines our strategy for 
estimating the effect of income inequality – measured by the income share of the top ten 
per cent or top one per cent. Section V presents our basic results, and Section VI provides 
several robustness checks. Section VII discusses the distributional implications of our 
findings. We conclude by summarizing our results. 
II. Theory and Existing Evidence  
In principle, top income shares could affect growth in a variety of ways.
4 If the 
rich have an unusually high marginal propensity to save, increases in top income shares 
should increase national savings.  Higher savings should, in turn, reduce the price of 
capital and raise investment, at least in economies that are not fully open to external 
capital flows. Inequality could also be positively related to growth if set-up costs for 
investment are large relative to median income, since concentration of asset ownership 
would then make big investments easier.  In addition, if top income shares rise because   5
returns to human capital are rising, both current and future workers have more incentive 
to invest in their human capital, which should eventually lower the cost of human capital 
and raise the growth rate. Within workplaces, tournament theory suggests that more wage 
dispersion will lead to higher productivity.
5 And to the extent that greater returns to 
entrepreneurship or higher-powered managerial incentives make businesspeople work 
harder, unequal societies may grow more rapidly. 
However, increases in top income shares could also have political consequences 
that reduce future growth. Larger top income shares make the median voter more likely to 
gain from redistribution, at least in the short run. If increases in top income shares lead to 
taxes or transfer payments that distort economic decisions regarding investment or labor 
supply, investment in both physical and human capital may fall, lowering growth (Barro 
2000). The rich may also take actions to prevent redistribution, such as lobbying or 
buying key votes in legislatures, that slow economic growth. Other channels through 
which inequality might affect growth – including credit constraints, crime, and corruption 
– are more relevant to developing countries or to inequality within the bottom 90 per cent 
of the distribution.
6  Finally, even if increases in top income shares do not affect growth, 
there may appear to be a causal link between the two if the same policies that increase 
growth also increase inequality. Low taxes on either capital gains or income from assets 
may encourage investment, for example, which may raise both the growth rate and the 
share of income going to the rich. We address this possibility in our empirical analysis.  
Because the sign of inequality’s effect on growth is theoretically ambiguous, the 
issue has inspired a large empirical literature, most of which has focused on the 
relationship between growth and broad measures of inequality, such as the Gini   6
coefficient. The early literature (notably, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 
1994, and Perotti 1996) regressed economic growth over some period (1960-1985 in 
Alesina and Rodrik) on the initial level of inequality (circa 1960), and found a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth. However, these studies were obviously 
susceptible to omitted variable bias, the direction of which was uncertain. 
7 In addition,  
they did not provide direct evidence on how a change in inequality within a given country 
affected its future growth (Forbes 2000). By contrast, panel data have allowed recent 
investigators to see whether changes in inequality within a given country are followed by 
changes in its growth rate. Using this approach, Forbes (2000) found that an increase in 
income inequality had a significant positive effect on a country’s economic growth over 
the next five years. 
There are at least two possible explanations for the difference between Forbes’s 
findings and earlier studies.  One possibility is that the earlier studies failed to control 
important growth-retarding characteristics of countries with high initial levels of 
inequality, and that including country fixed effects eliminated this source of bias, 
allowing Forbes to capture the positive effects of inequality per se. Forbes, however, 
suggests a second possible explanation, namely that the long-term effects of inequality 
differ from the short-term effects. Her estimates imply that when the level of inequality is 
above a country’s long-term average, the country grows unusually rapidly over the next 
few years.  The negative relationship found by both Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) may, in contrast, capture the longer run effect of inequality 
on growth. If high levels of inequality lower long-term growth by preventing low-income   7
parents from investing enough time and money in their children’s health and education, 
for example, this effect could take a generation to influence labor productivity.   
If the short-term effects of inequality on growth are positive while the long-term 
effects are negative, the effect of inequality should decline as the lag between the 
inequality measure and the growth measure increases.  At some point the net effect 
should be zero, after which it should become negative, at least for a while.  The literature 
is broadly consistent with this hypothesis.  When the Gini coefficient is measured on a 
scale that runs from 0 to 1, its standard deviation is about 0.1 in the samples used by both 
Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000).  Forbes estimates the effect of inequality on growth 1 to 
5 years later, but uses a 5 year lag where possible, so the average lag between the 
midpoint of the year in which inequality is measured and the midpoint of the growth 
window is between 3 and 5 years. Barro estimates the effect of inequality on growth 5 to 
15 years later, so his lags average 10 years. Forbes finds that a one standard deviation 
increase in a country’s Gini coefficient is followed by a 1.3  per cent increase in its 
average annual growth, while Barro finds that the same increase in inequality is followed 
by an 0.5 per cent increase in rich countries’ growth and an 0.5 per cent reduction in poor 
countries’ growth.
8  In Alesina and Rodrik (1994) the lag averages 12.5 years and the 
overall association is negative.
9 
Most previous literature uses broad measures of inequality like the Gini 
coefficient that do not distinguish between inequality in the top and bottom parts of the 
distribution.  When Voitchovsky (2005) uses the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to 
separate the effects of changes in inequality above and below the median, she finds that 
increased inequality in the top half of the income distribution is positively associated with   8
subsequent growth while increased inequality in the bottom half of the distribution is 
negatively associated with subsequent growth. Her estimates use GMM rather than 
country fixed effects, but they underscore the fact that measuring only inequality between 
those above and below the 90
th percentile may miss important effects of inequality within 
the bottom nine deciles. However, Barro (2000) finds that his results are qualitatively 
similar when he replaces the Gini coefficient with the income share of the top quintile.  
The empirical literature has not yet thrown much light on the mechanisms that 
link inequality to growth.  Barro (2000) concluded that the channel through which higher 
inequality fostered growth in rich countries was unlikely to involve investment, since the 
investment ratio was almost unrelated to inequality.  And while Barro did not have data 
on top income shares, Leigh and Posso (2009) found no systematic relationship between 
top income shares and savings using data for roughly the same countries and years 
covered in this paper. 
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) question the use of linear models to estimate the 
effects of changes in inequality on growth. They argue that growth is an inverted U-
shaped function of changes in inequality, and that any change in inequality, either 
positive or negative, lowers growth for the next few years.  We test this hypothesis in 
Section VI and find that it does not hold for top income shares in rich countries.  
Since our sample includes only industrialized economies and does not measure 
inequality within the bottom part of the distribution, past literature suggests that we 
should find a positive short-term relationship between inequality and growth but that the 
effect of inequality in any given period should decline over time and perhaps even turn 
negative. Of course, these expectations assume that the effects of top income shares are   9
like the effects of the broader inequality measures, notably the Gini coefficient, used in 
the earlier literature. That assumption is especially problematic with regard to negative 
long-term effects of inequality on growth, since negative effects are likely to reflect 
reductions in the share of total income going to the bottom deciles, which is imperfectly 
correlated with the share going to the top decile.    
One final limitation of past work on inequality and growth deserves attention, 
because it recurs in this paper. Changes in inequality are seldom attributable to 
exogenous shocks over which countries have no control. Even when inequality is 
“caused” by an exogenous shock, such as skill-biased technological change, the observed 
effect is likely to vary depending upon a country’s political and economic institutions and 
– more proximately – on the political preferences of the governing party.  When Sweden 
allowed economic inequality to rise in the 1990s, it was responding in part to an 
economic crisis that some Swedes attributed to excessive egalitarianism in the 1980s.  
One could make a similar argument with regard to the increases in inequality in the 
United Kingdom during the Thatcher years and the United States during the Reagan era.   
It might be possible to address the potential endogeneity of changes in economic 
inequality by using instrumental variables to estimate the impact of inequality per se on 
growth.  However, the problem with this approach is that it is difficult to identify an 
instrument that would satisfy the exclusion restriction (ie. the instrument must affect 
growth only through its impact on inequality).  Instead, both we and other researchers 
deal with the problem by introducing a lag between changes in inequality and changes in 
growth. This strategy works if the factors that alter inequality in year y have no lagged 
effects on growth in later years, which seems unlikely. If the changes that drive up   10
inequality in year y persist, leading to a sustained increase in inequality, there will be no 
simple way of separating the impact of inequality on subsequent growth from the effect 
of the drivers of inequality on subsequent growth. Rather than interpreting the estimated 
effect of a change in economic inequality as the effect of inequality per se, readers should 
therefore treat such estimates as potentially including some lagged effects of the 
institutions, policies, and circumstances that cause inequality to change at different rates 
and times in different countries. If that is the case, then as Lindert (2004) has forcefully 
argued, the effect of changes in economic inequality will depend on the particular 
policies that countries adopt to limit it.  We do not address that possibility here.            
III. Top Income Shares 
Our estimates of top income shares are drawn from a series of top incomes papers 
(Alvaredo and Saez 2006; Atkinson 2007; Atkinson and Leigh 2005; Atkinson and Leigh 
2007a; Dell 2007; Dell, Piketty and Saez 2007; Nolan 2007; Piketty 2007; Piketty and 
Saez 2006b; Roine and Waldenström 2008; Saez and Veall 2005; Salverda and Atkinson 
2007), many of which have been published or republished in the volumes edited by 
Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2009). We use two measures – the share of pretax income 
received by the richest 10 per cent and the richest 1 per cent of the population. Leigh 
(2007) makes some minor adjustments to the published series in order to create a more 
harmonized series for 12 rich countries.
10  
Our data provides estimates for an average of 62 years per country in the case of 
the top 10 per cent and 68 years per country in the case of the top 1 per cent (Table A1 
shows the exact years for the top 10 per cent share). These estimates compare the amount 
of income reported to the tax authorities by the richest 10 (or 1) percent of individuals (or   11
families) to an estimate of total personal income in the same year taken from a country’s 
national accounts.
11  Both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio are subject to 
error. The numerator will be understated if tax avoidance or evasion is common.
12 The 
denominator is likely to be less reliable prior to 1945, when national income estimates are 
less precise. Where possible, both the numerator and denominator exclude capital gains. 
Nevertheless, the top incomes data are likely to be subject to less measurement 
error than traditional data sources, such as the Deininger-Squire database (of course, the 
LIS data is an obvious exception). Indeed, previous research – notably Atkinson and 
Brandolini (2001) – has questioned the reliability of the Deininger-Squire inequality 
estimates. According to the Deininger and Squire “accept series”, for example, the Gini 
coefficient for France declined from 0.49 in both 1956 and 1962 to 0.35 in both 1979 and 
1984 (Figure 1). This change is roughly equivalent to the cross-sectional difference 
between Mexico and the United Kingdom in the Luxembourg Income Study data for 
2000).
13 By contrast, the French top income estimates from tax data suggest that the 
variation in income inequality over this period was much more modest. As Piketty (2003) 
notes, “since World War II, income inequality in France (as measured by the top decile 
income share) appears to have been fluctuating around a constant mean value of about 
32–33 percent, with no trend.” Other evidence on French inequality in the 1960s and 
1970s (eg. the wage dispersion data presented in Concialdi 1997) is also more consistent 
with the modest fluctuations implied by the top incomes estimates than with the dramatic 
drop implied by the Deininger-Squire dataset. 
The top panel of Table 1 shows the mean income share of the richest 10 per cent 
of the population (TopShare10) for 1920-39, 1940-59, 1960-79, and 1980-99 in each   12
country with data from the relevant period (this summary table omits 1905-19, for which 
we have relatively few observations). In six of the seven countries with data for the 1920s 
and 1930s TopShare10 was higher during these years than in any subsequent period.  The 
exception is Switzerland, where TopShare10 is remarkably stable throughout the years 
for which we have data.  TopShare10 falls substantially between 1920-39 and 1940-49 in 
the other five countries with data for both periods. It falls more slowly between 1940-59 
and 1960-79 in seven of the nine countries with data for both periods and rises slightly in 
other two.  There is no consistent trend between 1960-79 and 1980-99.  TopShare10 fell 
4.6 points in Sweden, 3.5 points in the Netherlands, and 2.7 points in France, but it rose 
more than five points in both the United States and the United Kingdom, and by smaller 
amounts in Australia and New Zealand.    
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows that growth was highest in the 1960s and 
1970s, when income concentration was lowest. Conversely, growth was lowest in the 
1920s and 1930s, when income concentration was highest. While these comparisons 
suggest that reducing inequality may boost growth, cross-country comparisons do not 
seem to support this notion.  In the 1920s and 1930s, the growth rate was about the same 
in the three countries with above-average inequality (the United States, the Netherlands, 
and France) as in the four countries with below-average inequality (Germany, New 
Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland).  In the 1980s and 1990s growth was fastest in Ireland 
and Spain, perhaps because they started off poorest. Among the other ten countries, 
TopShare10 was highest in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and the 
US and the UK were the only countries besides Ireland and Spain with annual per capita 
growth above 2 percent.  TopShare10  was lowest in Sweden, which grew relatively   13
slowly, but no more slowly than Canada. These comparisons can be misleading for a 
multitude of reasons, but they underscore the fact that simple descriptive statistics do not 
suggest a consistent causal story. 
Analysis of the 1940s and 1950s is complicated by the effects of World War II, 
which initially reduced both inequality and growth but may also have led to faster growth 
from 1945 to 1960. Both wars and severe economic downturns also compound 
measurement problems by reducing national statistical agencies’ capacity to collect 
reliable information (Banerjee and Duflo 2003). Until the 1950s, moreover, estimates of 
both GDP and total personal income (the denominator used to estimate top income shares 
from tax data) generally have to be constructed from incomplete data collected for other 
purposes. For this reason we focus primarily on the relationship between inequality and 
growth since 1960.  
To give some sense of this relationship, Figure 2 plots TopShare10 against a 5 
year moving average of the growth rate for the post-1960 years. Trends in TopShare10 
are far smoother than trends in GDP growth, even though we show GDP growth as a five 
year moving average.  This is one reason for using five year growth windows.     
IV. Identification Strategy 
We use panel models to estimate the effect of top income shares on growth. Our 
primary estimates come from a fixed effects model like that of Forbes (2000). Growth is 
estimated over five year windows that begin in year t  and run through t+4.  Each 
independent variable is measured one year before the growth window commences, in t-1.  
The model therefore has the form:   14
p i t i t i t i p i Income TopShare Growth , 1 , 2 1 , 1 , ε η α β β + + + + = − −      (1) 
where Growthi,p is average annual per capita growth for country i during period p, the 
first year of period p is t,  1 − t i TopShare ,  is our measure of income inequality in the year 
before the growth window opens (t-1),  1 , − t i Income is the natural logarithm of per capita 
GDP in the same year,  i α  and  t η are vectors of fixed country and year effects, and  p i, ε  is 
the error term. In our preferred models we estimate the dependent variable (Growthi,p) 
over a five year window, but we also test the robustness of our results by measuring 
growth on an annual basis.
14 
  While the use of five year growth windows reduces the effect of serial correlation 
on our standard errors, we also cluster standard errors at the country level, effectively 
allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each country. As Bertrand, 
Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) point out, this is analogous to applying a Newey-West 
correction (Newey and West 1987) in a panel context, allowing all lags to be potentially 
important. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan’s empirical findings suggest that our 
cluster-robust standard errors are slightly too small.
15 However, previous papers in this 
literature make no such adjustment, so our standard errors are more conservative than 
those in the earlier literature. 
Our post-1960 models augment equation 1 with the same control variables that 
Perotti (1996) and Forbes (2000) use: a measure of market distortions (the price level of 
investment relative to the United States) and the average years of secondary schooling 
completed by adult men and women.
16 Since our panel is limited to industrialized nations, 
we also control for average years of higher education among adult men and women. In   15
section VI we also present a robustness check that controls for the top marginal tax rate in 
the five countries for which we have such data. Our measures of the price of investment 
and adult educational attainment are only available in years divisible by five (1960, 
1965…1995), so we use growth windows that start in the following year (1961-65, 1966-
70…1996-2000). For example, we estimate the effect of TopShare10 and TopShare1 in 
1960 on a country’s average annual economic growth from 1961 to 1965, and so on.   
While the fixed effects model in equation 1 is our preferred specification, we also 
include random effects estimates for comparison. The random effects estimates are more 
efficient, because they also utilize the cross-sectional variation in the data, but if the 
country-specific effects are correlated with other right hand variables, the random effects 
estimates will be inconsistent. We use Hausman tests to check this independence 
assumption.  
We assess the importance of lags using a variant of equation 1, in which we 
measure growth using a one year rather than a five year window and use inequality 
measures lagged by n years: 
t i t i n t i n t i t i Income TopShare Growth , , 2 , 1 , ε η α γ γ + + + + = − −      (2) 
We estimate equation 2 using various combinations of lags, ranging from one to ten years 
(denoted  t-1…t-10). To gauge the overall effect of lagged inequality on growth, we 
calculate the linear sum of the lagged inequality coefficients. Although this approach 
allows us to exploit more of the variation in our data, it may also compound the effects of 
measurement error by emphasizing errors related to the timing of relationships (see Barro 
2000).
17   16
Interpretation: It is tempting to interpret the coefficient on the inequality measure 
in equation 1 (β1) as estimating the average effect of inequality in year t-1 on growth over 
the next five years. If the level of inequality in t-1 were uncorrelated with its level in 
earlier and later years, this interpretation would be compelling (at least if the model also 
included all other appropriate controls). In reality, however, our measures of inequality 
are serially correlated, and while equation 1 implicitly controls the mean level of 
inequality in a given country for all years on which we have data, it does not control 
inequality just before or just after t-1. The coefficient on TopSharet-1 therefore 
incorporates not only the effect of inequality in t-1 but any lagged effects of inequality in 
earlier years (t-2…) as well as the subsequent effects of inequality during the first four 
years of the growth window (t…t+3).   
Although inequality in t-1 is highly correlated with inequality in earlier years, the 
next section shows that the coefficients on lagged measures of TopShare10 from t-2 to t-
10 average out to about zero. For TopShare1, the coefficients on the lagged effects from 
t-2  to t-10 tend to be positive, but their sum is still not significant. As a result, the 
correlation between TopShare10 in t-1 and TopShare10 in earlier years should not greatly 
bias the coefficient on TopShare10t-1 in equation 1.  
The values of TopShare10 during the first four years of the growth window are, 
however, likely to influence the average rate of growth during the window.  If the lagged 
effect of TopShare10 on growth persists for only one year, as Section V suggests, the 
estimated effect of the level of inequality during t-1 will depend on the degree to which it 
predicts the level of inequality between t and t+3.      17
To estimate this relationship we regress the mean level of TopShare10 between t 
and t+3 on TopShare10 in t-1 using data for 1960-2000 and including country fixed 
effects.  When we do this, the coefficient on TopShare10t-1 is 0.904 (se = 0.022).  This 
estimate suggests that increments and decrements in TopShare10 change fairly slowly.  
That means we cannot interpret the coefficient on TopShare10t-1 as estimating the impact 
of a one point change in TopShare10 sustained for one year. Instead, we must interpret it 
as estimating the effect of a slightly smaller increase in TopShare10 sustained over five 
years. Specifically, if TopShare10 is one point above its long-term average in t-1, it will 
exceed its long term average for the country in question by 0.923 ([1.000 + 4×0.904]/5) 
points between t-1 and t+3. Assuming lagged effects last only one year, the average 
annual effect of a one point increase in TopShare10t-1 sustained over five years will be 
roughly β1/0.923.  
When we use TopShare1 in t-1 to predict the mean of TopShare1 between t and 
t+3 (including country fixed effects), the coefficient on TopShare1t-1 is 0.929 (se = 
0.025). For TopShare1, therefore, the coefficient in equation 1 estimates the effect of an 
0.943 ([1+ 4×0.929]/5) point increase in TopShare1 sustained over five years, and the 
average annual effect of a one point increase in TopShare1 between t and t+3 is roughly 
β1/0.943. These estimates suggest that equation 1 underestimates the average effect of 
one point increase in inequality sustained over five years, but that the downward bias is 
quite small. Nonetheless, we correct for it when interpreting our results.   18
V. Results 
We begin by presenting estimates from our base specification. As in Forbes 
(2000), growth is calculated over a five year window and inequality is measured one year 
prior to the start of the growth window. Panel A of Table 2 presents estimates for the full 
sample (1905-2000), first with pooled OLS, then with random effects and fixed effects. 
To account for the possibility that disruptive events such as wars affect both growth and 
inequality, Panel B of Table 2 re-estimates the models in Panel A excluding the five year 
windows that cover growth in 1911-20 and 1941-50.  
The coefficients on the logarithm of initial income are always negative in Table 2. 
The coefficients on the inequality measures are also negative and significant in the pooled 
OLS models. (This is consistent with the early cross-sectional literature on inequality and 
growth.) However, three of the four coefficients on the inequality measures become 
insignificant when we add country and year fixed effects, and the fourth coefficient 
(Panel A, Column 6) is significant only at the 10 per cent level. When we exclude 1911-
20 and 1941-50 in Panel B, the coefficient on inequality becomes very small, statistically 
insignificant, and positive. These results suggest that there is no consistent robust 
relationship between inequality and near-term growth for the 20
th century as a whole.   
Although it is possible that changes in inequality had no effect on growth over 
this long period, it is also possible that the relationship is just hard to detect during the 
first half of the twentieth century. Growth and inequality are probably not as precisely 
measured in that period, and while Panel B of Table 2 excludes 1911-20 and 1941-50, the 
postwar recoveries continued in the 1920s and 1950s, perhaps further obscuring the effect 
of inequality. The Great Depression of the 1930s may have had a similar effect.   19
Table 3 therefore presents estimates for the post-1960 period, when there were no 
major wars or depressions and when the data are presumably better. When we measure 
inequality using the income share of the richest 10 per cent, its estimated effect on growth 
since 1960 is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels with most 
estimation techniques. Our preferred specification is in column 6, which includes country 
and year fixed effects plus time-varying controls. In this specification, TopShare10 is 
positively and significantly related to growth, with a coefficient of 0.112. In Panel B, 
which replaces TopShare10 with TopShare1, the coefficients are about as large as those 
for  TopShare10 in Panel A, but because the standard errors are much larger the 
coefficients are seldom significant.       
Although our preferred specifications include both country and year fixed effects, 
Table 3 also shows pooled OLS and random effects specifications for comparison. While 
the coefficients on top income shares are always positive in these specifications, they 
tend to be smaller and less statistically significant than in the fixed effects models. 
Unsurprisingly, the estimated coefficient on inequality is more sensitive to the inclusion 
of control variables in the pooled OLS and random effects models than in the fixed 
effects models, suggesting that omitted country characteristics bias the coefficient on 
inequality downward in those models.  
Hausman specification tests seldom reject the hypothesis that the differences 
between the fixed effects and random effects models are due to chance – the exception 
being column 4 in Panel A. However, the hypothesis that stable but unmeasured 
differences between countries affect both growth and inequality seems to us more   20
plausible from a theoretical viewpoint than the hypothesis that there are no such 
differences, so we prefer the fixed effects estimates.  
Lagged effects: Our preferred specification does not include controls for the effect 
of inequality more than one year before the growth window opens.  To see if longer lags 
are important, we now use the same sample and the same independent variables as in 
Table 3 but estimate growth for single years rather than five-year intervals and add lags 
of 2 to 10 years. Tables 4 and 5 show the results for TopShare10 and  TopShare1 
respectively.  Because the values of top income shares are serially correlated, the standard 
errors increase dramatically as we add more lags to our models, and the point estimates 
become less stable.  In Table 4, for example, the point estimate for t-5 ranges from 0.069 
in column 2 to 0.286 in column 4.   
Nonetheless, the positive effect of income inequality on growth is consistently 
strongest in the first year after inequality is measured.  Looking first at the estimates for 
TopShare10 in Table 4, the coefficient on the 1-year lag in column 1 is much larger than 
the coefficient on the 5-year lag in column 2. In column 3, which includes five sequential 
lags, the coefficient on the 1-year lag is 0.221, while to the sum of the coefficients on the 
2 to 5 year lags is -0.034.  In column 4, which includes ten sequential lags, the coefficient 
on the 1-year lag is 0.281, while the sum of the coefficients on the 2 to 9 year lags is 
0.028 (se = 0.196). Nonetheless, the F-test for the joint significance of these nine lags 
(shown in the bottom row of Table 4) is significant (p = 0.022), implying that while the 
mean of the nine coefficients is not significant their variance is greater than we would 
expect by chance. However, since their mean is close to zero, ignoring these lags should 
not appreciably bias the estimated coefficient on TopShare10t-1.     21
Table 5 shows analogous estimates for TopShare1.  The standard errors on the 
lags are even larger than in Table 4, and the point estimates are more volatile. 
Nonetheless, the basic story is fairly similar to that for TopShare10. Comparing columns 
1 and 2, the coefficient on the 1-year lag is again much larger than the coefficient on the 
5-year lag.  In column 3, the coefficient on the 1-year lag is 0.309, while the coefficients 
on the 2 to 5 year lags sum to -0.119 (se = 0.235).  In column 4, the coefficient on the 1-
year lag falls to 0.154, while the coefficients on the 2 to 10 year lags sum to 0.243 (se = 
0.350).  This is the only instance in which the point estimates for the lagged effects of 
inequality after the first year are large enough to be of substantive importance, but their 
sum does not differ significantly from zero, and the F-test indicates that they are not 
jointly significant.     
Taken together, Tables 4 and 5 suggest that once inequality in year t-1 is 
controlled, lagged values of inequality in earlier years add little useful information.  This 
somewhat surprising result should not be over generalized.  It may not hold for broader 
measures of inequality that capture variation within the bottom nine deciles, for periods 
when the level of inequality is more volatile than it is in this sample, or for poorer 
countries.  The apparently minor impact of lags in this sample does, however, simplify 
the task of interpreting the coefficients on top income shares in Tables 3 and 4.  
If the lagged effects of TopShare10 fluctuate around zero after the first year, the 
cumulative impact of a sustained increase in inequality should closely approximate the 
average effect of inequality in year t-1 on growth in year t multiplied by the number of 
years for which the increase is sustained.  In our preferred specification (Model 6 in 
Table 3), for example, the coefficient on TopShare10 is 0.112.  Since a one point increase   22
in TopShare10t-1 implies an average increase of 0.923 in TopShare10 between t-1 and 
t+3, the estimated first year effect of a one point change in TopShare10 is to increase 
GDP by 0.121 (0.112/0.923) per cent.
18  If a one point increase in TopShare10 were 
sustained over 10 years, per capita GDP at the end of ten years would typically be 1.22 
(1.00121
10 - 1) per cent higher than if TopShare10  had not changed.  If a 10 point 
increase in TopShare10 were sustained for ten years, GDP would be 12.2 per cent higher 
than if TopShare10 had not changed.  The estimated effect of a 10 point rise TopShare1 
sustained for ten years is quite similar (10.7 percent), but it has a larger standard error.          
VI. Robustness Checks  
We now investigate the sensitivity of our conclusions to six potential sources of 
error: our assumption that changes in inequality have linear effects, our particular choice 
of inequality measures, the absence of controls for top tax rates, outliers, weighting 
countries only by the number of years for which we have data, and relying on Maddison 
(2003, 2007) for estimates of per capita GDP.   
Do changes in inequality have linear effects?  Using a sample that includes both 
rich and poor countries, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) find evidence that both increases and 
decreases in the Gini coefficient reduce the rate of economic growth. To investigate this 
possibility we first transform all the independent variables in Table 3 into changes 
between  t-6  and  t-1 as Banerjee and Duflo do. Because we are now taking first-
differences, we also drop our country fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 show the 
coefficients of changes in TopShare10 and TopShare1  between t-6 and t-1 when we 
predict average annual GDP growth between t and t+4.      23
Next, we split the 5-year change in inequality into two separate variables. The 
first variable takes the value of the change if inequality rose and is zero otherwise. The 
second variable takes the value of the change if inequality fell and is zero otherwise.  If 
Banerjee and Duflo’s hypothesis applies in our sample, the coefficients on these variables 
should both be negative. That is not the case. The coefficients on increases in 
TopShare10 and TopShare1, shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 6, are both positive and 
highly significant – the opposite of what Banerjee and Duflo’s findings predict. This 
difference may reflect the fact that our sample is limited to rich countries or that our 
inequality measures are limited to the top of the distribution. The coefficients on 
reductions in TopShare10 or TopShare1, also shown in columns 2 and 4, are insignificant 
and close to zero, but their 95 per cent confidence intervals include fairly large negative 
values, so they are not necessarily inconsistent with Banerjee and Duflo’s findings.
19  
In contrast to Banerjee and Duflo, our preferred models assume that changes in 
inequality have linear effects.  If that were the case, the coefficients on increases and 
decreases in inequality should have the same sign and be of the same magnitude.  The 
magnitudes of the coefficients on increases and decreases in inequality obviously differ in 
Table 6, and for TopShare1 even the signs differ. However, the standard errors of these 
coefficients are so large that we cannot reject the hypothesis that their true values are 
equal.  That means we cannot reject the hypothesis that changes in inequality have linear 
effects.
20 
Alternative measures of inequality. We have estimated the effect of inequality 
using the income shares of the top 10 per cent and the top 1 per cent. However, about 
one-third of the income received by the top 10 per cent goes to the top 1 per cent.  Thus it   24
is potentially more instructive to split the top 10 per cent’s share into two non-
overlapping components: the share received by the top 1 per cent and the share received 
by the next 9 per cent. Table 7 shows the results when we include both of these measures 
in a fixed effects specification. The top 1 per cent’s share is never both positively and 
significantly related to the growth rate. Indeed, the relationship is negative and significant 
for the full sample. By contrast, the share of the next 9  per cent is positively and 
significantly related to growth in three of the four specifications. In our preferred 
specification (column 4), the coefficient on the next 9 per cent’s share (0.239) is about 
twice as large as the coefficient on the share of the top 10 per cent (0.112) in Column 6 of 
Panel A in Table 3. While the standard errors are considerably larger in Table 7 than in 
Table 3, much of this difference derives from the inclusion of two correlated inequality 
measures in the same regression.
21 When we drop the share of the top 1 per cent and 
replace TopShare10 in column 6 of Table 3 with the share of the those between the 90
th 
and 99
th percentiles, the coefficient rises from 0.112 (se=0.016) to 0.210 (se=0.025), 
which is still significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Most previous studies of inequality and growth have used Gini coefficients rather 
than top income shares.  To see how our results change if we use Gini coefficients in our 
sample of countries, we draw on two data sources. For comparability with Forbes (2000), 
we first use the Deininger and Squire (DS) ‘accept’ series. Then, taking account of 
Atkinson and Brandolini’s critique of those data, we use Gini coefficients from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
22 Table 8 shows our results. The coefficients on the 
Gini are positive in all specifications, but because we have relatively few observations, 
the standard errors are quite large and the coefficients on the Gini are never significant.   25
The Forbes sample closest to ours covers countries with per-capita GNP above $6000.  
There, the coefficient on the Gini is 0.0022 (Forbes 2000, Table 5, Row 11), which is an 
order of magnitude smaller than the coefficients in our Table 8.  
Top tax rates. High marginal tax rates are negatively related to top income shares 
(Atkinson and Leigh 2007b). Many theories suggest that high marginal tax rates also 
reduce economic growth. The positive relationship between top income shares and 
growth since 1960 could therefore be driven by the fact that lowering taxes raises both 
top income shares and GDP growth.  We have annual data on top marginal tax rates for 
the five countries covered by Atkinson and Leigh’s study: Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Table 9 presents results for these 
five countries using the same specification as column 6 of Table 3. Columns 1 and 3 of 
Table 9 show estimates with the top tax rate excluded. Columns 2 and 4 show estimates 
with it included.  The coefficient on the top tax rate in t-1 when we use it to predict GDP 
growth from t to t+4 is small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that top tax rates 
are unlikely to explain much of the linkage between top income shares and growth.   
Comparing columns 1 and 2 supports this conclusion. Controlling top tax rates actually 
raises the coefficient on TopShare10 slightly (from 0.125 to 0.148). The coefficient on 
TopShare1 falls, but only from 0.171 to 0.169.   
Outliers.  To assess the importance of outliers we reran our preferred models 
(shown in column 6 of Table 3) twelve times, dropping a different country each time. No 
single country appears to have a disproportionate impact on the relationship between 
TopShare10 and growth, and the coefficient on TopShare10 only varies from 0.10 to   26
0.14. In each case the relationship between inequality and growth also remains significant 
at the 1 per cent level.  
When we perform the same exercise for TopShare1, however, the coefficient 
ranges from 0.07 to 0.13. While the relationship is usually insignificant, it becomes 
significant at the 5 per cent level if either Ireland or New Zealand is excluded. Ireland and 
New Zealand are our two smallest countries, accounting for only 1.2 per cent of the 12-
country sample’s 610 million inhabitants in 2000.  Our finding that the income share of 
the top one per cent is insignificant should therefore be treated cautiously.   
Weighting.  Because growth rates vary more across small countries than large 
countries, we also tried weighting each country by its population in 1960. Population 
weighting reduces the coefficient on TopShare10 in our preferred specification from 
0.112 (se=0.025) to 0.103 (se=0.015) and increases the coefficient on TopShare1 from 
0.095 (se=0.057) to 0.154 (se=0.028). Thus, while TopShare1 is statistically insignificant 
in column 6 of Table 3, it is significant at the 1  per cent level when countries are 
weighted by their 1960 population.  This reinforces our caution against assuming that 
because the coefficient of TopShare1 is insignificant in our preferred specification its true 
effect is negligible.   
Data sources. We use growth rates taken from Maddison (2003, 2007). Maddison 
measures changes in GDP per capita by converting all national estimates to 1990 
International Geary-Khamis dollars. For the years since 1960 we can replace Maddison’s 
estimates with estimates from the World Development Indicators database and measure 
per capita GDP in constant local currency units. After making this change, the coefficient 
on TopShare10 in our preferred specification rises from 0.112 (se = 0.025) to 0.125 (se =   27
0.022), and the coefficient on TopShare1 rises from 0.095 (se = 0.057) to 0.126 (se = 
0.058). When we use the World Development Indicators estimate of per capita GNI 
rather than GDP (again measured in constant local currency units), the coefficient on 
TopShare10 in our preferred specification rises to 0.127 (se = 0.026), while the 
coefficient on TopShare1  rises to 0.159 (se = 0.067). Thus while TopShare1  is not 
significant at conventional levels in column 6 of Table 3, it is significant at the 10 per 
cent level when we measure GDP changes in local currency units and at the 5 per cent 
level when we replace GDP changes with GNI changes in local currency units.  
VII. Trickle-down effects 
Our preferred estimate is that a 1 point rise in the share of the richest 10 per cent 
sustained over five years raises average annual growth by 0.121 percentage points. One 
obvious question is whether such an increase in growth is large enough to raise the 
incomes of households in the bottom 90 percent of the distribution as well as those in the 
top 10 percent. That is, if the income share of the richest 10 per cent rises by 1 percentage 
point, will the resulting increase in growth be large enough to compensate the bottom 
90 per cent of the distribution for the fact that their share of total income has fallen by 1 
percentage point? Or, to put it differently, does an increase in top income shares have a 
‘trickle-down effect’ that raises absolute incomes for those further down in the 
distribution? 
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the answer to this question is ‘not 
for a long time.’  In the United States, for example, TopShare10 averaged 32.0 percent 
between 1960 and 1979 and 42.0 percent between 1995 and 2004. Our preferred model   28
implies that a sustained 10 point increase in the level of TopShare10 makes annual GDP 
growth 1.21 percentage points higher than it would be if TopShare10 were 10 points 
lower.
23 If personal income rises at the same rate as GDP, annual growth in personal 
income will also be 1.21 points higher.  
However, raising the top decile’s share of income from 32 to 42 per cent also 
lowers the bottom nine deciles’ total share from 68 to 58 per cent.  If the entire increase 
in inequality occurred in a single year, the mean personal income of the bottom nine 
deciles in the following year would be 13.7 per cent lower ([58/68]×[1.021]-1) than if 
inequality had not risen and growth had not accelerated.  The cost of higher inequality 
diminishes over time, however, because the effects of higher growth are cumulative. If 
the top decile’s share remains at 42 per cent for 10 years, total personal income will be 
1.0121
10 = 1.128 times higher than it would have been if TopShare10 had been only 32 
per cent.  As a result, the mean income of the bottom nine deciles will be only 3.8 per 
cent ([58/68]×[1.128]-1) lower than if inequality had not risen. After 13 years the bottom 
nine deciles reach the ‘breakeven’ point where faster growth in total personal income 
finally offsets the fact that they are now getting a smaller share of the total.
24  If a higher 
level of inequality continues to yield higher growth indefinitely, our simulation implies 
that the absolute incomes gains of the bottom nine deciles will become progressively 
larger. However, our data cannot tell us whether such long-term projections are realistic.  
Another way to think about this question is to simulate the impact of 
TopShare10’s actual trajectory in United States, again assuming that a one point increase 
in the level of TopShare10 raises growth by 0.121 per cent for as long as the higher level 
of TopShare10 persists.  Because the top decile’s share hardly changed between 1960 and   29
1970, we focus on the period since 1970.  The solid lines in Figure 3 show the observed 
trend in mean income among families with incomes above and below the 90
th percentile.  
The dashed lines show the predicted trend if TopShare10 had remained at its 1970 level.   
This simulation suggests that if inequality had not risen the mean income of the 
top decile would have been 49 log points lower than it was in 2003. The picture is very 
different for the bottom nine deciles. From 1970 through 1985 the growth-promoting and 
share-reducing effects of rising inequality roughly offset one another. However, 
TopShare10 rises almost four per cent between 1986 and 1989.  As a result, the mean 
income of the bottom nine deciles over the ensuing decade is 4 to 7 points lower than it 
would have been if inequality had remained at its 1970 level. From 1998 to 2003, in 
contrast, the income share of the top decile was high but stable.  As a result, the growth-
promoting effects of the higher level of inequality began to offset the share-reducing 
effect. Indeed, the simulation suggests that by 2001 the growth-promoting effects of 
redistribution had pushed the mean income of the bottom nine deciles above what it 
would have been if their share of total income had not fallen from 68 to 58 per cent over 
the previous thirty years.   
Naturally, all the foregoing calculations are overly simple. The estimates have 
large sampling errors.  They ignore the fact that changes in the income share of the 
bottom nine deciles often proxy changes in the distribution of income within the bottom 
nine deciles. They also assume that a change in inequality has the same effect regardless 
of its cause, which seems unlikely. How we think about this question also depends on the 
type of social welfare function we have in mind. But at the very least, the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals for our preferred estimates appear to rule out the claim that a rise in   30
top income shares causes a large short-term increase or decrease in economic growth.  
The claim that inequality at the top of the distribution either benefits or harms everyone 
therefore depends on long-term effects that we cannot estimate very precisely even with 
these data.   
VIII. Conclusion 
This paper has used panel techniques to estimate the relationship between 
economic growth and inequality, as measured by top incomes shares. Our results support 
Forbes’s (2000) conclusion that increases in inequality lead to more growth. There 
appears to be some trickle-down effect in the long run, but since the impact of a change 
in inequality on economic growth is quite small, it is difficult to be sure from our 
estimates whether the bottom 90 per cent will really be better off or not. 
We could not investigate the impact of inequality within the bottom nine deciles 
of the distribution. But if Voitchovsky (2005) is right that inequality between the bottom 
and the middle of the distribution (relative poverty) lowers growth while inequality 
between the top and the middle (relative affluence) raises growth, our measures of 
inequality presumably overestimate the positive effects of across-the-board increases in 
inequality on growth.    31
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Figure 1: How Trends in Income Inequality Vary Across Data Sources –  
France as a Case Study 
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Figure 2: Top Incomes and Growth Since 1960 
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Figure 3: Trends from 1970 to 2003 for the Income of the Top Decile and the 
Bottom Nine Deciles in the United States: Observed Means versus Predicted Means 
if the Top Decile’s Share Had Stayed at Its 1970 Level  
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Simulations assume that the ratio of personal income to GDP is 0.83 (the mean
value for the US over this period).  41
 
Table 1: Top Income Shares and Average Annual Growth 
Period  1920-1939 1940-1959  1960-1979  1980-1999 
Income share of the richest 10%
†        
Australia --  30.05  27.83  27.84 
Canada --  38.59  37.30  36.95 
France 42.54  33.64  34.40  31.71 
Germany 35.79  --  31.27  33.26 
Ireland --  --  --  32.82 
The Netherlands  42.84  38.73  31.46  27.92 
New Zealand  35.28  30.24  31.02  30.36 
Spain --  --  --  34.00 
Sweden 37.30  31.48  28.13  23.53 
Switzerland 31.20  31.75  31.42  29.93 
United Kingdom  --  33.41  31.18  36.57 
United States  43.68  33.73  32.00  37.66 
Sample mean 
(Standard deviation) 
38.37 
(4.73) 
33.51 
(3.22) 
31.60 
(2.74) 
31.88 
(4.22) 
         
Average annual GDP per capita 
growth (per cent) 
      
Australia 1.03  1.69  2.47  1.98 
Canada 1.06  2.43  3.12  1.43 
France 2.00  2.87  3.49  1.55 
Germany 3.35  1.43  3.03  1.34 
Ireland --  1.41  3.41  4.38 
The Netherlands  1.37  2.38  2.89  1.80 
New Zealand  0.68  2.14  1.31  1.31 
Spain -0.64  1.93  5.56  2.44 
Sweden 2.97  2.71  2.67  1.43 
Switzerland 1.96  3.14  1.87  0.74 
United Kingdom  1.61  0.92  2.13  2.07 
United States  0.84  2.38  2.56  2.02 
Sample mean 
(Standard deviation) 
1.48 
(1.10) 
2.12 
(0.66) 
2.87 
(1.86) 
1.87 
(0.91) 
 
† Top incomes are averages for each time period. When there are missing observations, 
we show period averages only if at least ten observations are available. Data for 1905-19 
not shown.   42
    
Table 2: Top Incomes and Growth Over the Twentieth Century 
Dependent variable: Average annual per capita growth (5 year periods) 
 
Estimation method  Pooled OLS  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
   
        
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Panel A: 1905 – 2000 (including World Wars I and II) 
Income share of richest 10%  -0.085*   -0.024  -0.032  
  [0.044]  [0.040]  [0.050]  
Income share of richest 1%   -0.179***   -0.068    -0.105* 
   [0.050]  [0.057]  [0.058] 
Log(GDP per capita)  -0.582  -0.928*** -1.968*** -2.284***  -3.026**  -4.077*** 
  [0.342] [0.297] [0.597] [0.691] [1.253] [1.256] 
Country  Fixed  Effects?  No No No No Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.04 0.07 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.34 
Countries  12 12 12 12 12 12 
Observations  156 169 156 169 156 169 
 
Panel B: 1905 – 2000 (excluding World Wars I and II) 
Income share of richest 10%  -0.052*   0.001    0.03   
  [0.028]  [0.024]  [0.041]  
Income share of richest 1%   -0.104**   0.005    0.001 
   [0.036]  [0.041]  [0.041] 
Log(GDP per capita)  -0.575* -0.857**  -2.888***  -3.740***  -3.618* -4.872** 
  [0.294] [0.280] [0.716] [0.771] [1.713] [1.665] 
Country  Fixed  Effects?  No No No No Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.04 0.05 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.47 
Countries  12 12 12 12 12 12 
Observations  134 144 134 144 134 144 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. R
2 is the 
within-R
2 for random and fixed effects. Table 3: Top Incomes and Growth Since 1960 
Dependent variable: Average annual per capita growth (5 year periods) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5]  [6] 
 OLS  OLS  RE  RE  FE  FE 
Panel A: Top 10% Share 
Income share of richest 10%  0.073** 0.049  0.062***  0.037  0.110***  0.112*** 
  [0.026] [0.032] [0.021] [0.025]  [0.016]  [0.025] 
Log(GDP per capita)  -1.595*** -1.415*** -2.428*** -2.375***  -2.271  -2.1 
  [0.264] [0.418] [0.566] [0.743]  [2.917]  [3.017] 
Investment and Schooling 
Controls?  
No Yes No Yes  No  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  No No No No  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.20 0.21 0.48 0.43  0.49  0.49 
Countries  12 12 12 12  12  12 
Observations  89 87 89 87  89  87 
Hausman Test 
H0: Difference in coefficients 
not systematic 
   3.07  19.86     
P>Chi2     P=1.00  P=0.09     
 
Panel B: Top 1% Share 
Income share of richest 1%  0.067 0.049  0.06  0.057  0.136***  0.095 
  [0.059] [0.071] [0.044] [0.061]  [0.038]  [0.057] 
Log(GDP per capita)  -1.615*** -1.440*** -2.522*** -2.474***  -1.993  -1.777 
  [0.320] [0.402] [0.561] [0.658]  [2.997]  [3.234] 
Investment and Schooling 
Controls?  
No Yes No Yes  No  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  No No No No  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.16 0.20 0.46 0.42  0.47  0.46 
Countries  12 12 12 12  12  12 
Observations  89 87 89 87  89  87 
Hausman Test 
H0: Difference in coefficients 
not systematic 
   10.37  10.68     
P>Chi2     P=0.96  P=0.63     
 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. R
2 is the 
within-R
2 for random and fixed effects. Investment and schooling controls are the price 
level of investment relative to the US at PPP, the average years of secondary education 
for the male and female adult population, and the average years of post-secondary 
education for the male and female adult population.  
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Table 4: Top 10% Share and Growth Since 1960 with Various Lags 
Dependent variable: Per capita growth in year t 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-1)  0.191***   0.221  0.281 
 [0.042]    [0.138]  [0.213] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-2)     -0.001  -0.132 
     [0.266]  [0.257] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-3)     -0.128  -0.093 
     [0.203]  [0.342] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-4)     0.003  0.051 
     [0.258]  [0.312] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-5)   0.069  0.092  0.286 
   [0.057]  [0.165]  [0.366] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-6)       -0.412 
       [0.265] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-7)       0.099 
       [0.355] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-8)       -0.038 
       [0.383] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-9)       -0.165 
       [0.288] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-10)           0.432** 
       [0.178] 
GDP, Investment price, and Schooling 
Controls?  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R
2  0.40 0.38  0.49 0.57 
Countries 12  12  12  12 
Observations 391  391  343  283 
Sum of Top 10% coefficients (all lags)         0.187***     0.310*** 
     [0.056]  [0.100] 
Sum of Top 10% coefficients (t-2 to t-5)      -0.034   
     [0.125]   
Sum of Top 10% coefficients (t-2 to t-10)        0.028 
       [0.196] 
F-test for joint significance of lags t-2 to t-5 
   [P-value] 
   0.43 
[P=0.782] 
 
F-test for joint significance of lags t-2 to t-10 
   [P-value] 
     3.74 
[P=0.022]
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. GDP, investment price, and 
schooling are the log of GDP per capita, the price of investment relative to the US at PPP, the 
average years of secondary education for the adult male and adult female population, and the 
average years of post-secondary education for the adult male and adult female population. 
Investment price and schooling are available only at 5-year intervals and are linearly interpolated 
between these points. Each of these controls is included with as many lags as the top income 
share.    45
 
Table 5: Top 1% Share and Growth Since 1960 with Various Lags 
Dependent variable: Per capita growth in year t 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-1)  0.244**   0.309  0.154 
 [0.092]    [0.233]  [0.336] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-2)     -0.244  -0.061 
     [0.339]  [0.328] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-3)     -0.068  0.011 
     [0.358]  [0.651] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-4)     0.352  0.320 
     [0.453]  [0.541] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-5)   0.046  -0.159  0.128 
   [0.084]  [0.286]  [0.456] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-6)      -0.286 
       [0.300] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-7)      -0.666 
       [0.638] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-8)      0.595 
       [0.604] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-9)      -0.449 
       [0.428] 
Income share of richest 1% (t-10)      0.651 
       [0.441] 
GDP, Investment price and Schooling Controls?   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2  0.38 0.38 0.48 0.56 
Countries  12 12 12 12 
Observations 391  391  343  283 
Sum of Top 1% coefficients (all lags)      0.190  0.397* 
     [0.132]  [0.204] 
Sum of Top 1% coefficients (t-2 to t-5)      -0.119    
     [0.235]   
Sum of Top 1% coefficients (t-2 to t-10)        0.243    
       [0.350] 
F-test for joint significance of lags t-2 to t-5 
   [P-value] 
   0.22 
[P=0.924] 
 
F-test for joint significance of lags t-2 to t-10 
   [P-value] 
    1.37 
[P=0.304] 
 
Notes: Same as Table 4.     46
 
Table 6: Is the Relationship of Changes in Top Incomes to Growth Non-Linear? 
Dependent variable: Average annual per capita growth (5 year periods) 
Sample: 1960-2000 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
ΔTopShare10  0.131***      
  [0.034]      
ΔTopShare10 {ΔTopShare10>0}   0.197***    
   [0.052]    
ΔTopShare10 {ΔTopShare10≤0}   0.053    
   [0.072]    
ΔTopShare1     0.192**   
     [0.066]   
ΔTopShare1 {ΔTopShare1>0}      0.388*** 
      [0.117] 
ΔTopShare1 {ΔTopShare1≤0}      -0.004 
      [0.174] 
Log(GDP per capita)  -2.215** -2.162** -2.399** -2.352** 
  [0.797] [0.820] [0.817] [0.859] 
Investment price and Schooling Controls?   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  No No No No 
Year Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2  0.44 0.45 0.43 0.44 
Countries  12 12 12 12 
Observations  85 85 85 85 
F-Test. H0: β(Increase)= β(Decrease)   2.055    2.119 
     0.179    0.173 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. 
Investment and schooling controls are the price level of investment relative to the US at 
PPP, the average years of high schooling for the male and female population, and the 
average years of post-secondary education for the male and female population. Changes 
in all independent variables, including inequality, are averages for six years (t-6 to t-1).  
Growth is averaged for five years (t  to t+4).   47
 
Table 7: Including Shares of Top 1 per cent and Next 9 per cent Simultaneously 
Dependent variable: Average annual per capita growth (5 year periods) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 Full  sample 
(1905-2000) 
Full sample 
(excl. wars) 
1960-2000 1960-2000 
Income share of richest 1%  -0.189** -0.055  0.077  -0.072 
  [0.078] [0.047] [0.077] [0.122] 
Income share of next 9%  0.165* 0.130 0.134*  0.239** 
  [0.090] [0.075] [0.071] [0.091] 
Log(GDP per capita)  -2.682** -3.316*  -2.302  -2.036 
  [1.069] [1.575] [2.923] [2.891] 
Investment and Schooling Controls?   No  No  No  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2  0.32 0.50 0.49 0.51 
Countries 12  12  12  12 
Observations 156  134  89  87 
 
Notes: Same as Table 3. 
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Table 8: Inequality and Growth Using Gini Coefficients Since 1960 
Dependent variable: Average annual per capita growth (5 year periods) 
Sample is 1960-2000 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 DS  Ginis LIS  Ginis 
Gini  0.016 0.021 0.059 0.087 
  [0.027] [0.027] [0.040] [0.052] 
Log(GDP per capita)  -8.722*** -9.138***  -0.668  -0.652 
  [1.608] [1.762] [4.285] [4.491] 
Investment price and Schooling 
Controls?  
No Yes No Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2  0.57 0.57 0.61 0.64 
Countries  11 11 11 11 
Observations  55 54 45 45 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. 
Investment and schooling controls are the price level of investment relative to the US at 
PPP, the average years of high schooling for the male and female population, and the 
average years of post-secondary education for the male and female population.    49
 
 
Table 9: Effect of Controlling for Top Tax Rates 
Dependent variable: Average annual per capita growth (5 year periods) 
Sample: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom & United States, 1960-
2000 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Income share of richest 10%  0.125* 0.148*     
  [0.045] [0.060]     
Income share of richest 1%     0.171  0.169 
  [0.128] [0.141] 
Log(GDP per capita)  -7.506** -7.628** -8.233**  -8.213** 
  [1.859] [2.135] [2.421]  [2.670] 
Top Marginal Tax Rate   0.010  -0.001 
   [0.013]   [0.010] 
Investment and Schooling Controls?   Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.71 0.71 0.68  0.68 
Countries 5  5  5  5 
Observations  40 40 40  40 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. 
Investment and schooling controls are the price level of investment relative to the US at 
PPP, the average years of secondary schooling for the male and female population, and 
the average years of post-secondary education for the male and female population.  
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Table A1: Data Coverage and Adjustments 
Country N  Period(s)  Adjustments   
Australia 61  1942–2002  Converted to calendar year basis. 
Canada 60  1941-2000  No adjustments made. 
France   81  1905 and 
1919–1998 
Top income shares for 1900-1910 are based on average 
data for the period, so this number is assigned to 1905. 
Germany   38  1961–1998  No adjustments made. 
Ireland   30  1939–1943 
and 1976–
2000 
Converted to calendar year basis.  
Netherlands 86  1914–1999  No adjustments made. 
New Zealand   78  1925–2002  Adjusted 1% series taken from Table 3. Unadjusted 10% 
series taken from Table 1 and adjusted in a similar manner 
(1924-40 data scaled up by 1.04, missing years 
interpolated, and 1924-52 increased by 5.79). Both series 
then converted to calendar year basis. 
Spain   22  1981–2002  No adjustments made 
Sweden 87  1903–1920, 
1930–1935 
and 1941–
2003 
No adjustments made.  
Switzerland 64  1933–1996  Taxpayers are only required to file returns every two 
years, so we assign the same figure to both years (except 
1933). 
United Kingdom   52  1919 and 
1950–2000 
In 1908-1989, 10 per cent share multiplied by 1.081 and 1 
per cent share multiplied by 1.130, to take account of the 
shift from joint to individual filing in 1990. Converted to 
calendar year basis. 
United States   85  1917–2001  No adjustments made. 
Total   744  1903–2003   
 
Note: Sample size refers to the top 10% series but is similar for the top 1% series. All 
adjustments are described in further detail in Leigh (2007). 
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Endnotes 
 
 
1 A more recent database is the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, which 
is effectively an expanded version of the Deininger-Squire database. Similar issues apply 
to the use of this database as to the Deininger-Squire database.     
2 Piketty and Saez (2006a) identify the relationship between top income shares and 
growth as an important open question in the literature. 
3 In a paper drafted contemporaneously with this one, Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström 
(2007) analyze the correlates of top income shares in a panel of 16 developed and 
developing countries. In a first-differenced specification, they find a positive relationship 
between economic growth and changes in top income shares. However, an important 
difference between their paper and ours is that their analysis looks at contemporaneous 
effects, which allows causation to run in either direction; while we look only at the effect 
of lagged inequality on growth. 
4 For a more detailed treatment of the theory on inequality and growth, see Galor and 
Zeira (1993), Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa (1999), and Bénabou (2005). 
5 On tournament theory, see Lazear and Rosen (1981), Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1993); 
Eriksson (1999); Heyman (2005); though cf. Akerlof and Yellen (1990). 
6 For instance, if credit constraints are binding, poor households may under-invest in 
their children’s nutrition, health, and education, even when the rate of return would be 
high. Underinvestment is likely to be more important in poorer countries, but it probably 
plays some role even in the rich countries we study.  Even if this is the case, however, we   52
 
would expect under-investment in children’s nutrition, health, and education in our 
sample to depend more on income inequality within the bottom nine income deciles than 
on the share of total income going to the top decile.  Corruption is greater in more 
unequal societies (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer 2003), and higher corruption is 
linked to lower growth (Mauro 1995). Likewise, violent crime appears to be greater in 
more unequal societies (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002), and high levels of 
crime can discourage transactions that would otherwise make both parties better off. 
7  For example, if countries with above-average growth in the 1950s also had above-
average growth in the 1960s, and if above-average growth in the 1950s broadened 
political support for efforts to reduce inequality, the cross-country association between 
lower inequality in 1960 and higher subsequent growth might just reflect the inequality-
reducing effect of pre-1960 growth.  
8 Barro measured growth over a ten year window and generally measured inequality five 
years before the window opened. So for the first period, growth is calculated for 1965-
1975 and is matched to a Gini coefficient from about 1960.  Forbes measured growth 
over a five year period and generally measured inequality one year before the window 
opened.  Thus growth from 1976 to 1980 it is matched to a Gini for 1975. 
9 Recall that in Alesina and Rodrik (1994) the window for the growth calculation is 1960-
1985 and inequality is measured around 1960, so the first year of the growth window is 
typically concurrent with the inequality measure. 
10 Leigh (2007) provides data for 13 countries. In this paper we exclude Japan because 
information on the income share of the top 10% is unavailable.    53
 
11 In Australia, Canada and Spain, the tax unit is the individual. In France, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States, the tax unit is a married couple or single 
individuals. Germany has a hybrid system, with most taxpayers filing as tax units, and the 
very rich filing as individuals. The tax unit switched from the household to the individual 
in New Zealand (in 1953), Sweden (in 1971) and in the United Kingdom (in 1990). See 
Leigh (2007) for details on the adjustments made to the top incomes series in these 
countries to account for this shift. 
12 The available data on tax underreporting are patchy, but Leigh (2009) finds no 
evidence of large differences across countries, nor of changes over time within countries 
for which multiple measures of tax underreporting are available. 
13 According to the Deininger-Squire database, more than half of this decline in the Gini 
coefficient –8 points – took place between 1975 and 1979. Apparently occurring in just 
four years, this change is almost twice as large as the rise in the United States Gini 
coefficient over the 1980s – a period when inequality is generally regarded to have risen 
dramatically (Card and Di Nardo 2002). Another possible interpretation is that the 
difference was due to a change in the underlying data source. The Deininger-Squire 
“accept series” is taken from a United Nations compendium of income distribution 
statistics for the years 1956-75, and from the Luxembourg Income Study from 1979 
onwards. 
14 We use GDP per capita data from Maddison (2003, 2007), expressed in 1990 
International Geary-Khamis dollars. We use Maddison’s estimates because they cover the 
complete period, while most other data sources are limited to the post-1945 era. As we   54
 
show below, our results for the period from 1960 onwards do not change if we use GDP 
growth or GNI growth from the World Development Indicators database. 
15 In Monte Carlo simulations using 21 years of data from the US Current Population 
Survey, Bertrand et al. (2004) find that this technique performs quite well in finite 
samples. The rejection rate (at the 5 per cent level) is 6.3 per cent for N=50; 5.8 per cent 
for N=20; and 8 per cent for N=10. N=12 in our sample. 
16 The price level of investment (PPPI) is a proxy for price distortions in the economy. It 
is calculated by dividing the purchasing power parity (PPP) for investment goods by the 
US dollar exchange rate. As countries become richer, the relative price of investment 
goods tends to fall (Summers and Heston 1991). By construction, PPPI for the US takes 
the value of unity in all years.  
17 Regarding the practice of using 5 or 10 year windows to measure growth, Barro (2000: 
11) notes: “The low-frequency context accords, in any event, with the underlying theories 
of growth, which do not attempt to explain short-run business fluctuations. In these 
theories, the short-run response—for example, of the rate of economic growth to a 
change in a public institution—is not as clearly specified as the medium- and long-run 
response. Therefore, the application of the theories to annual or other high-frequency 
observations would compound the measurement error in the data by emphasizing errors 
related to the timing of relationships.” 
18 We also estimated this parameter by regressing average annual growth between t and 
t+4 on the mean of TopShare10 from t-1 to t+3, making the mean lag one year   In this 
specification the coefficient on the mean of TopShare10  was 0.130 (se = 0.0303).  This   55
 
estimate, like the 0.121 estimate in the text, may incorporate some reverse causation, 
because growth in earlier parts of the 5-year window can influence inequality later in the 
window.  
19 We also experimented with interacting our top income share measures with the change 
in top income shares from one five-year period to the next (i.e. augmenting the 
specification in column 6 of Table 3 by adding a difference and a difference interaction). 
When we do this, the coefficient on the top income share variables remain similar, and 
both the difference variable and the interaction are statistically insignificant.   
20 Taken at face value our point estimates imply that increases in inequality raise growth 
while decreases in inequality have little effect on growth.  If that were really the case, 
regularly raising and lowering top income shares would allow countries to raise growth 
while leaving top income shares unchanged over the long run. Because this implication of 
our point estimates strikes us as implausible, we emphasize the size of the standard 
errors. 
21 The correlation between the shares of the top 1 per cent and the next 9 per cent in the 
1960-2000 sample is 0.4; this correlation rises to 0.6 in the post-1980 period. 
22 The income concept in the Luxembourg Income Study is household disposable income, 
equivalized by dividing by the square root of the number of household members. 
23 Where β is the coefficient estimate, I is the increase in inequality, and N is the number 
of years over which the effect is cumulated, the proportional increase in GDP is 
exp(β×I×N)-1. Since we are dealing with relatively small values of β, I, and N, it makes 
little difference if we simplify this using the approximation β×I×N.    56
 
24 If t is the number of years over which a rise in TopShare10 must be sustained for the 
bottom nine deciles to gain enough in absolute terms to offset the decline in their share of 
personal income, and if the one point increase in TopShare10 continues to raise the log of 
per capita GDP by 0.121, “breakeven” will occur when t = [ln(68/58)]/0.0121 = 13.1 
years.  The estimates using annual growth data and ten years of data on TopShare10 
(Table 4, column 4) have qualitatively similar implications. 